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BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES

Theory and Reality in the International Protection of
Human Rights. ByJ. Shand Watson. Ardsley NY:
Transnational Publishers, 1999. Pp. x, 325.
Index. $115.

Human rights law, arguably the fastest growing
field in international law, has achieved a moral
plateau that is unique in international affairs. As
noted by two leading human rights scholars,
Henry Steiner and Philip Alston, in just over "a
mere half century, the human rights movement
that grew out of the Second World War has be
come an indelible part of our legal, political and
moral landscape."1 There is a now a presumption
that the assertion of an entitlement acquires
virtually irrefutable validity once it is transformed
into a human right. As Louis Henkin has noted,
"human rights is today the single, paramount
virtue to which vice pays homage, that govern
ments today do not feel free to preach what they
may persist in practicing."2 In other words, inter
national human rights law is real, effective, and
an obligatory regime of global civilization today.
Yet it is precisely this truism that J. Shand
Watson ofMercer University Law School seeks to
debunk. The thrust ofhis argument is both simple
and clear: the yawning gulf between theory and
practice renders human rights law a meaningless
facade that has substance only in the abstracted
minds of academics. In the eleven chapters of

Theory and Reality in the International Protection of
Human Rights, Watson emphasizes the same

theme over and over again: international law is
impotent and cannot prevent oppression within
the borders of sovereign states. Watson charges
that the "academic community would be well
advised to stop making extravagant claims about
what international law can do for the oppressed,
and instead analyse the reasons for the lack of
success of the human rights idea" (p. x). Watson
wants to talk about the death of the idea of
1 See HENRY J. STEINER & PlllLIP AI.SfON, INIER
NATIONALHUMAN RIGI-ffS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS,
MORALS 3 (2d ed. 2000).
2
LOUJSHENKIN, THEAGEOFRIGI-ffS, atix-x (1990).
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human rights. But in choosing to focus on the
issue of enforcement as such, Watson fails to
address the penetration of the idea of human
rights within almost all states, and he does not
take into account the implications of such pene
tration for the cultural, political, and historical
legitimacy of human rights.
Wielding a relentless, if somewhat blunt,
Austinian machete, Watson embarks on a positiv
istic crusade whose sole purposes are to disembowel
the human rights movement and, conversely, to
restore the supremacy of state sovereignty. The
opening chapter is little more than a catalogue
of human rights violations that have met with
international inaction and acquiescence. He notes
that atrocities of the past, such as the Inquisition
and the destruction of Carthage, "are not sepa
rate and isolated historical events that occurred
at a time when human nature was vastly worse
than it is today" (p. 1). Nay, they are on "a con
tinuum leading ineluctably to the massive slaugh
ters in Russia and Cambodia, the genocide ofthe
Indian populations in North and South America,
the starvation of Ethiopian citizens by their
government, and the tribal excesses in Rwanda
and Burundi" (id.). To these, he could have
added slavery, colonialism, apartheid, imperial
conquests and exploitation, the vagaries of an
unjust global economic order, and the Holo
caust, to name just a few. Watson then mocks
human rights treaties and other binding interna
tional human rights instruments as wishful think
ing. He points to repeated failures to enforce
these international obligations when gruesome
atrocities have been committed. It is this distance
between facts on the ground and lofty inter
national human rights norms that, in Watson's
view, makes human rights fictitious.
At various points in the book, Watson decries
what he calls the wrong choice oflegal theory in
the human rights area. In one chapter, for ex
ample, he concentrates on the lack of sanctions
or power to enforce human rights because ofill
conceived theories that model international law
on "the typical domestic hierarchy" (p. 47). He
argues in another chapter that sanctions have
rarely worked because individual states cannot be
forced to honor them. Moreover, the United
Nations is impotent to make states comply. He
notes that ifcustom is the true practice of states,
then the norm is in the breach, not observance,
ofhuman rights. In discussing the ineffectiveness
ofUN resolutions on human rights, he contends
that states sign on because they know that such
texts are only formally binding, presumably
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because they have no bite. Wherever he looks,
national rights trump human rights.
While Watson certainly raises several important
questions, his central claims are fatally flawed in
fundamental ways. It is certainly true that there
is a gaping and frustrating gap between the
noble aspirations of human rights and the egregious violations that continue to characterize
state practice in every country in the world. International institutions, and particularly the United
Nations, have been quite ineffectual-and in
most instances, disastrously so-in enforcing
human rights.3 The failures are painfully obvious.
In the recent past, failures by the international
community to respond to human rights violations-even to genocide, as was the case in 1994
in Rwanda-have underscored the difficulties
that bedevil the international enforcement of
human rights norms. In the cases of Rwanda and
Sierra Leone-and before them, Somalia-the
unwillingness and inability ofthe United Nations
to act responsibly reflected not a decision to
respect the sovereignty of these states, but a
decision by the West not to expend resources in
a part of the world it deemed worthless.' More
generally-and contrary to what Shand assertsrespectfor sovereignty is onlyafacade that masks
the underlying political or other reasons for
decisions not to intervene in response to significant human rights violations.
Although the United Nations is obviously a
creature and institution ofsovereign states and is
therefore bound by its Charter to respect the
sovereignty of its members, it has in recent years
taken a more active posture toward the enforcement of human rights. The UN debacles in
Rwanda and Somalia-as well as its inability to
respond effectively to the atrocities in the former
Yugoslavia-embarrassed the world body and
drew attention to the urgent need for more
effective intervention. The creation of the International Tribunals for RwandaP and for the
' See Implications ofInternational Response to Events
in Rwanda, Kosovo Examined by Secretary-General, in
Address to General Assembly, UN Press Release
GA/9595 (Sept. 20, 1999), obtainablefrom <http://
www.un.org> (UN NewsCentre); Makau wa Mutua,
LookingPasttheHumanRightsCommittee:AnArgumentfor
De-MarginalizingEnforcement,4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L.REV.

211 (1998).
4 See UN DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, UNITED
NATIONS AND RWANDA: 1993-1996 (1996), UN Sales
No. E.96.I.20; Peter Rosenblum, Dodging the Challenge,
10 HARV. HUM. RTS.J. 313 (1997).
' See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 955, UN

Doc. S/1995/134 (1994).
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Former Yugoslavia, as well as the adoption in
December 1998 in Rome of the statute of the
international criminal court,7 evidences the
desire to create more effective organs for enforcement. It is important to note that all of
these actions came after long periods of resistance and opposition by major Western powers,
including the United States, and only after
intense public scrutiny and unrelenting media
coverage. The United Nations has a maze of
Charter bodies and treaties-from the Commission on Human Rights, to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-that are
slowly building practice and norms in the enforcement ofhuman rights.8 In addition, regional
9
organizations, such as the European Union, the
Organization of American States," and the
Organization of African Unity," have in varying
degrees started to emphasize human rights and
to take steps to enforce them. While grim, the
picture is not as hopeless as Watson would have
us believe. There is halting, if painfully slow and
cautious, movement towards enforcement.
Contrary to what Watson suggests, the spread
and effectiveness of human rights norms are not
best assessed through the lens of international
enforcement. Instead, one should look at the
dramatic and transformative impact of human
rights norms on the legal, constitutional, and
political cultures of states. The true test for the
effectiveness of human rights law is not at the
vertical level-that is, where international institutions act on domestic legal orders-but rather
in the assimilation and adoption ofhuman rights
norms by and within states. Seen from this perspective, human rights norms have had an almost miraculous impact on the psyches ofstates,
cultures, and societies around the world. As is
evident today, the idea ofconstitutionalism-and
with it, liberal constitutions themselves-has
spread worldwide. This legal paradigm, which is
6 See SC

Res. 808 (Feb. 22, 1993).

7 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

July 17, 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.138/9* (1998).
8 See THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A
CRrFIcALAPPRAISAL (Philip Alston ed., 1992).
' See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Towards a Theory of SupranationalEffective Adjudication,
107 YALE LJ. 273 (1997).
" See Cecilia Medina, The Inter-AmericanCommission on
HumanRights and theInter-American CourtofHuman Rights:
Reflections on ajointVenture, 12 HUM. RTS. Q.439 (1990).
1See ChidiAnselm Odinkalu, ThelndividualComplaints
ProcedureoftheAfrican Commission onHumanandPeoples'
Rights: A Preliminary Assessment, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 359 (1998).
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integrally connected with human rights, is creat
ing societies whose guiding principles are driven
by human rights. A case in point is the South
African post-apartheid state, which I have called
a "human rights state."12 Henkin has captured
the power of human rights in this bold passage:
Ours is the age of rights. Human rights is
the idea ofour time, the only political-moral
idea that has received universal acceptance.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted by the United Nations General As
sembly in 1948, has been approved by vir
tually all governments representing all soci
eties. Human rights are enshrined in the
constitutions of virtually every one of today's
170 states-old states and new; religious,
secular, and atheist; Western and Eastern;
democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian;
market economy, socialist, and mixed; ricp.
and poor, developed, developing, and less
developed. Human rights is the subject of
numerous international agreements, the
daily grist of the mills of international poli
tics, and a bone of continuing contention
among superpowers.13
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legitimacy. Its rhetoric and discourse are arro
gant and abusive of non-European, nonliberal
traditions and cultures. 14 Although it is possible
that a genuinely universal discourse may emerge
concerning the nature of human dignity and the
types of political arrangements that can best pro
tect that dignity, there needs to be a recognition
that the current human rights corpus is, in effect,
just one proposal for what that universal discourse
ought to be. An excavation of diverse traditions is
necessaryifadeep, lasting, and universal agreement
on a regime of human rights is to be achieved. In
the meantime, Watson's Theory and Reality in the
International Protection ofHumanRightsis a valuable
reminder not only of the vexing problems of
enforcement, but also of the urgent need for
scholarship that probes the complexity of the
human rights project.
MAKAU MUTUA

SUNY-Buffalo School of Law

The penetration of human rights below the
surface of the state-their entry into, and effec
tive governance of, most legal systems today-is
the single most important measure of the success
of the idea of human rights. Instead of dying, as
Watson suggests, the idea of human rights has
now become an integral part of the fabric of
societies throughout the world. Domestic legal
systems-that is, in effect, sovereign states-are
now enforcing human rights because they consti
tute domestic law. What is more, civil-society
organizations in many countries now vigilantly
police government respect for, and guarantees
of, basic human rights. The fact that human rights
laws are nevertheless violated does not distin
guish them from other species of rights or obli
gations in criminal law, tort law, or contract law.
In focusing on enforcement as the exclusive
measure of the success or failure of the human
rights project, Watson draws attention away from
the one critical shortcoming that continues to
vex that project. In my view, the human rights
corpus is a fundamentally Eurocentric doctrine
that consequently suffers from several basic biases.
Precisely because that corpus falls squarely within
the historical continuum of the colonial project
in which a superior and a subordinate are the
essential actors-it lacks genuine cross-cultural
12 Makau waMutua, Hope and Despairfor a New South
Africa: TheLimits ofRightsDiscourse, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS.

J. 63, 65 (1997).
13

HENKIN, supra note 2, at ix.

14 SeeMakauMutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The
Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT'L LJ. 201
(2001); Makau waMutua, The Ideology ofHuman Rights,
36 VA.J. INT'LL. 589 (1996).

